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Eighth Circuit Revisits Restoration
Exception to Domestic Violence Gun Ban
and Says "Restore" Means "Restore"
United States v. Kirchoff'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the restoration exception to the 1996 Domestic Violence Gun
Ban, a convicted domestic abuser, who would otherwise be prohibited from
possessing a firearm under federal law, may be allowed to do so if the per-
son's civil rights have been restored under state law.2 The circuits have split
over how to best implement the congressional policy behind the Domestic
Violence Gun Ban and the restoration exception because differing state laws
have caused divergent application of the exception to federal defendants. The
Eighth Circuit first visited this issue in 1999, when it held that defendants who
have never lost their civil rights, by definition, cannot have them restored, and,
therefore, such defendants do not qualify for the restoration exception.
3
Under the Eighth Circuit's analysis and Missouri law, a person who did
not go to jail following a domestic violence conviction may be forever barred
from possessing a firearm, while a person who did serve jail time will be able
to possess a firearm upon completion of the sentence.4 Several circuits have
adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning. Others have attempted to avoid simi-
larly odd results.5 For example, the First and Sixth Circuits have held that
persons who have not lost their civil rights under state law may, nevertheless,
be treated as having them restored in order to qualify for the restoration ex-
ception. 6 In United States v. Kirchoff, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its posi-
tion; as a result, application of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban, its restora-
tion exception, and Missouri law continue to give firearms privileges to pre-
viously incarcerated domestic abusers while denying firearms privileges to
domestic abusers whose behavior did not warrant a sentence of confinement.
7
1. 387 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2936 (2005).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), 922(g) (2000).
3. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623-26 (8th Cir. 1999). See infra notes
60-68, 85-89 and accompanying text.
4. See Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 751.
5. See infra note 101.
6. United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595-97 (6th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 631 (1st Cir. 1996).
7. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750-52.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In February 2000, Springfield attorney Bill Kirchoff was charged with
three misdemeanor counts of third-degree assault under Missouri law for
assaulting his girlfriend.8 In January 2001, Kirchoff was charged with two
misdemeanor counts of third-degree domestic assault.9 For both the February
2000 and January 2001 charges, Kirchoff was released on bond.'0 However,
his bond for the February 2000 charges was revoked because, while out on
bond, he had threatened a witness and assaulted his girlfriend again." The
associate circuit judge ordered Kirchoff held in the Greene County jail with-
out bond. 12 The cases were consolidated, and Kirchoff entered guilty pleas.' 3
The state court sentenced him to concurrent one-year sentences but suspended
execution of the sentences and placed him on probation until April 2003.14 The
judge ordered Kirchoff's attorney to confiscate his firearms and ordered police
to escort Kirchoff s victim to his home so she could collect her belongings.'
5
On August 7, 2002, Kirchoff was charged in federal court with posses-
sion of a firearm by a person who had been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.' 6 The indictment charged that from April through
June 2002, while Kirchoff was on probation for the state court assault convic-
tions, he possessed a 12-gauge shotgun, a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition,
and a .556 caliber rifle. 17 One week after the federal charges were brought
against Kirchoff, the Missouri state court revoked his probation; accordingly,
he began serving his sentence for the state criminal charges.8
On December 13, 2002, while serving his prison sentence, Kirchoff filed
a motion to dismiss the federal indictment on the grounds that he qualified for
the restoration exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which provides:
8. Id. at 749; Attorney Jailed for Violating Bond, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER,
March 15, 2001, at lB. Kirchoff was charged with violating Mo. REV. STAT. §
565.070 (2000). Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 749.
9. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 749. Kirchoff was charged with violating Mo. REV.
STAT. § 565.074 (2000). Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.; Attorney Receives Probation in Assault, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER,
April 14, 2001, at lB. Vernon County Associate Circuit Judge Gerald McBeth heard
the case because all Greene County judges had previously recused themselves. Id.
12. Attorney Jailed for Violating Bond, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, March 15,
2001, at lB.
13. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 749.
14. Id.
15. Attorney Receives Probation in Assault, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, April
14,2001, at lB.
16. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 749. His possession was in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9) (2000). Id. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of [a do-
mestic violence misdemeanor] if the conviction ... is an offense
for which the person ... has had civil rights restored (if the law of
the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense) .... 19
The District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the motion to
dismiss, reasoning that, because Kirchoff had never been confined under a sen-
tence of imprisonment (a prerequisite to loss of civil rights under Missouri
law), he had never lost his civil rights.20 Because Kirchoff had never lost his
civil rights, those rights could not have been restored to him. The court relied
on two earlier Eighth Circuit cases that held the plain language of the restora-
tion exception does not include defendants who have not lost their civil rights.
22
Kirchoff appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the Eighth Cir-
cuit.23 The appellate court held that when a person convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence under Missouri law is charged with vio-
lating the federal Domestic Violence Gun Ban of 1996, the defendant only
qualifies for the restoration exception after actual incarceration, which is nec-
essary under Missouri law to trigger a loss of civil rights. 24 Furthermore,
when the federal defendant has served a pretrial detention for the state case,
that detention does not trigger loss of civil rights under Missouri law because
pretrial detention does not qualify as being "confined under a sentence of
imprisonment. ' 25 Finally, when the defendant serves prison time for the fed-
eral possession offense, thereby losing his civil rights, the restoration of those
rights upon release does not retroactively qualify the defendant for the resto-
ration exception. 26 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Kirchoff s motion to dismiss his federal indictment.27
19. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000); Kirchoff, 387 F,3d at 749-50. Missouri
law provides for the loss of civil rights by disqualifying a person convicted of any
crime from voting in an election while confined under a sentence of imprisonment.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000).
20. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750.
21. Id.
22. Id. See United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623-26 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Keeney, 241 F.3d 1040, 1043-45 (8th Cir. 2001).
23. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750.
24. Id. at 750-52.
25. Id. at 752 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 749. Kirchoff was ultimately disbarred. Disciplinary Actions, 61 J. Mo.
B. 215 (July-Aug. 2005).
2006]
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Domestic Violence Gun Ban of 1996
Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 196828 to strengthen federal con-
trol over firearms traffic and help the states regulate firearms traffic within their
borders.29 The Gun Control Act, part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968,30 supplanted the Federal Firearms Act of
1938.31 A goal of both the Gun Control Act of 1968 and its predecessor was to
prevent certain people - those considered more dangerous than others - from
owning firearms. 32 In pursuit of that goal, the Gun Control Act prevents sale to
or possession by certain classes of people, including felons.3 3 For the first
twenty-eight years of its life, however, the Gun Control Act allowed people
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of violence to possess firearms.
34
Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, believed
that allowing people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence
to possess guns was a major flaw in the Gun Control Act.35 Accordingly, on
March 21, 1996, he introduced legislation to remedy the problem.36 This leg-
islation would become known as the "Domestic Violence Gun Ban."37 Sena-
tor Lautenberg announced that the ban would close the loophole in federal
28. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 901-02, 82 Stat. 197, 225-26 (1968); Pub. L. No. 90-
618, §§ 101-02, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213-14 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
921-31 (2000 & Supp. 2002)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 2 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410,
4411. Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968 pursuant to its constitutional power
under the Commerce Clause. 79 AM. JUR. 2D Weapons and Firearms § 8 (2004).
30. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 684 (2004).
31. W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Lawfulness of Sale or Other Disposition of
Firearms or Ammunition Under 18 US.C.A. § 922(d), 34 A.L.R. FED. 430 § 2[a]
(1977).
32. Id.
33. Id. Under the Gun Control Act as originally passed and amended in 1968, a
person was a member of one of the prohibited classes if he or she was a fugitive from
justice; under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by more than one
year incarceration; a user or addict of narcotics, marijuana, stimulants, or depressants;
or an adjudicated "mental defective" or person committed to a mental institution. 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(d), (g), (h) (Supp. 1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2000)). See Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922, 80 Stat. 1213, 1220-21 (1968).
34. 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (daily ed. March 21, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Frank R. Lautenberg, No Guns for Wife-Beaters, WASH. POST,
Apr. 3, 1997, at A21; Adam Piore, Domestic Violence Gun Ban Advances, THE
RECORD (Northern New Jersey), July 27, 1996, at C 15.
37. For the purposes of this Note, "Domestic Violence Gun Ban" shall mean 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
(Vol. 71
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law by prohibiting people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from
possessing firearms.
38
According to Senator Lautenberg, many domestic abusers are never
charged with a felony, perhaps because of plea bargains.39 If they walked
away with only a misdemeanor conviction, under pre-1996 federal law, they
would be allowed to possess firearms. 40 He believed that such a result was
unacceptable because of the interplay of two factors: the prevalence of do-
mestic abuse,4 ' and the widespread use of guns by many abusers:
[M]uch of the killing and maiming associated with domestic vio-
lence could not happen but for the presence of a firearm. The New
England Journal of Medicine reports that in households with a his-
tory of battering, a gun in the home increases the likelihood that a
woman will be murdered fivefold. Often, the only difference be-
tween a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a
gun.42
In an attempt to address this problem, the Domestic Violence Gun Ban added
domestic abusers as a class of people prohibited under federal law from pos-
sessing firearms.
43
Senator Lautenberg's amendment to the Gun Control Act makes it a fed-
eral offense for a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence to possess a firearm.44 "Misdemeanor crime of domestic




41. Lautenberg preferred the following statistics:
[Elach year an estimated 2 million women are victimized by domestic
violence. That is 10 times the number of women who are diagnosed with
breast cancer. Of those 2 million women, nearly 6,000 die at the hands of
men who at least at one time claimed to love them. About 70 percent of
the time, those hands are holding a gun.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. This was necessary, according to Senator Lautenberg, because "[tihose
guilty of acts of domestic violence should not be trusted to acquire or possess a gun.
Period." Id.
44. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000). The current version of section
922(g) provides that a person is a member of one of the prohibited classes if he or she
is: (1) convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, (2) a fugitive
from justice, (3) a drug user or addict, (4) an adjudicated mental defective or commit-
ted to a mental institution, (5) an illegal alien or an alien admitted under a nonimmi-
grant visa, (6) dishonorably discharged from the military, (7) a former U.S. citizen
who has renounced that citizenship, (8) subject to a domestic violence restraining
order, or (9) a domestic violence misdemeanant. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
2006]
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violence" is defined as a crime that is a misdemeanor under state or federal
law, and involves the "use or attempted use of physical force, or the threat-
ened use of a deadly weapon" by a person in a domestic relationship with the
victim. 45 On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Domestic Vio-
lence Gun Ban into law.
46
B. The Restoration Exception
Although the 1996 Domestic Violence Gun Ban prohibits people con-
victed of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms,
an exception applies if the misdemeanant's civil rights have been revoked and
subsequently restored under state law.47 The statutory loss of civil rights
stems from the common law concept of civil death for felons, which pre-
vented people convicted of felonies from performing legal functions. 41 Com-
45. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2000). The exact language of the definition is as
follows:
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term 'misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence' means an offense that -
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is co-
habiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or
guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.
Id.
46. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3610, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1935 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Domestic Violence Gun Ban
ultimately passed as part of a spending bill. See David Pace, New Bill Adopts Gun
Ban for Domestic Violence, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 1996, at A4.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000). Restoration of civil rights is not the
only way to avoid application of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban: section
921 (a)(33)(B)(ii) says a person is not considered to have been convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor:
if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for
which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the
law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil
rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess,
or receive firearms.
Id.
48. See 2 1A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1311 (2004).
There were three principal incidents consequent upon an attainder for trea-
son or felony, - forfeiture, corruption of blood, and an extinction of civil
rights, more or less complete, which was denominated civil death. ... The
incident of civil death attended every attainder of treason or felony,
[Vol. 71
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mon law civil death has not survived in the United States, but convicted per-
sons may lose certain civil rights - such as the rights to vote, serve on a jury,
and hold public office - pursuant to state statutes. 49 If a person loses civil
rights in this way and those rights are later restored by operation of state law
(for example, upon completion of a jail sentence), then the restoration excep-
tion of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban applies. 50 The person is no longer
considered to have been convicted of the crime and, therefore, he or she may
legally possess firearms.
51
Missouri law provides for the loss of some civil rights upon conviction
of a crime. 52 First, a person convicted of any crime loses the right to vote
"while confined under a sentence of imprisonment. ' , 53 Second, a person con-
victed of any crime related to voting loses the right to vote forever.5 4 Finally,
a person convicted of a felony loses the right to serve on a jury forever.55
Taken together, Missouri law and the restoration exception of the Domestic
Violence Gun Ban authorize a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence who has served a sentence of imprisonment (during which
civil rights were lost) to possess a gun after the sentence ends and civil rights
have been restored.
56
C. The Circuit Split on Interpretation of the Restoration Exception
The restoration exception of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban allows
people who have lost their civil rights and subsequently had them restored to
possess firearms.57 By contrast, people who have not had their civil rights
restored may not take advantage of the restoration exception and, therefore,
are prohibited from possessing firearms.58 The restoration exception thus
distinguishes between people who have lost their civil rights (presumably
because they committed a more serious offense and therefore had to serve jail
whereby... the attainted person "is disabled to bring any action, for he is
extra legem positus ['out of the law'], and is accounted in law civiliter
mortuus ['civilly dead',]"... "he is disqualified from being a witness, can
bring no action, nor perform any legal function; he is in short regarded as
dead in law."
Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (citations and quotation marks omit-
ted); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 624, 1035 (8th ed. 2004).
49. 21 A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1311 (2004).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
51. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
52. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026 (2000).
53. Id. § 561.026(1).
54. Id. § 561.026(2).
55. Id. § 561.026(3).
56. See id. § 561.026(1); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
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time) and people who have not lost their civil rights (presumably because
they committed a minor offense and, therefore, were not sentenced to con-
finement). As a result of this distinction, those who committed more serious
crimes will be able to possess firearms upon release from incarceration,
whereas those who were never confined are banned from possessing firearms
forever. Defendants in the latter group argue that Congress could not possibly
have meant to allow presumably more dangerous criminals to possess guns
while presumably less dangerous misdemeanants remain subject to the Do-
mestic Violence Gun Ban. 59
In United States v. Smith, 60 the Eighth Circuit rejected a defendant's ar-
gument that the distinction between a misdemeanant who fails to qualify for
the restoration exception because he never lost his civil rights and a felon
who does qualify because his civil rights were restored violates equal protec-
tion.6 1 In Smith, the defendant had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor assault
under Iowa law for assaulting the mother of his child and was fined $100.62
Two years later, Smith shot and wounded the same woman during an argu-
ment and was convicted of firearm possession in violation of the Domestic
Violence Gun Ban.63 Because Iowa does not strip misdemeanants of their
civil rights, Smith never lost his.64 Nevertheless, Smith argued the restoration
exception should apply to him because the end result was the same - he had
his civil rights - and it was irrelevant whether they had been restored to him
or whether he had never lost them under Iowa law.
65
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that in order to have
civil rights restored, a person must first lose them.66 Applying the rational basis
standard to its equal protection analysis, the court held that the distinction
drawn by the statute was a result of Congress's express reference in the statute
to state laws that vary on loss and restoration of civil rights.67 Continuing its
59. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 629 (1st Cir. 1996).
60. 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
61. Id. at 624-26.
62. Id. at 619.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 623.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 623-24.
67. Id. at 624. The court noted that the restoration exception for felons, upon which
the domestic violence misdemeanant restoration exception was patterned, see infra note
73, had survived constitutional challenges because "it was rational for Congress to rely
on 'a state's judgment that a particular person or class of persons is, despite a prior con-
viction, sufficiently trustworthy to possess firearms,' despite the anomalous results."
Smith, 171 F.3d at 624-25 (quoting McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1995)). In addition to such judicial acceptance of the "much-criticized" restoration
exception for felons, Congress, although aware of the inconsistency, continued to look
to state law for both restoration exceptions. Id. at 625. Congress was willing to allow the
[Vol. 71
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analysis, the court found that the distinction was rationally related to the legiti-
mate government interest of extending the firearm ban to domestic abusers.68
In holding that a person must first lose their civil rights in order to have
them restored and fit within the restoration exception, the Eighth Circuit ex-
plicitly refused to adopt the fiction indulged in by the First Circuit in United
69States v. Indelicato. In Indelicato, the defendant was convicted in federal
court for firearms possession after pleading guilty in Massachusetts state
court to committing assault and battery with a knife and carrying a dangerous
weapon.70 Both offenses are termed "misdemeanors" under Massachusetts
law, and Massachusetts does not strip misdemeanants of their civil rights.7'
Indelicato argued that he qualified for the restoration exception because Mas-
sachusetts had never taken away his civil rights and his firearms privileges
had not been restricted under state law.
72
Facing the same argument as offered in Smith and the instant case, the
First Circuit in Indelicato looked to the legislative history of the restoration
exception to interpret its proper application. 73 In enacting the restoration ex-
disparity because it was concerned with domestic abusers who could escape liability
under the felony possession provision by simply pleading down to a misdemeanor. Id.
With only a misdemeanor conviction, they could legally possess firearms and use them
in the next round of abuse. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that Smith was not entirely
precluded from future firearm possession - if he were pardoned or his conviction were
expunged, for example, he would qualify for the exception. Id. Therefore, the exception
did not "invidiously discriminate against him." Id. at 626.
68. Id. at 624-26.
69. 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 628. The predicate offenses for his federal firearms conviction were
defined as "misdemeanors" under Massachusetts law, but were punishable by a
maximum of two and a half years in prison. Id. Thus, Indelicato was charged with
violating the "felon-in-possession" statute (even though the predicate offenses were
not termed "felonies" in Massachusetts), which prohibits firearms possession by a
person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. Id.; 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000).
7 1. Indelicato, 97 F.3d at 628-29.
72. Id. at 628.
73. Id. at 629. Because Indelicato was charged with violating the felon-in-
possession statute, see supra note 70, he argued that the restoration exception for
felons, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000), should apply to him. Indelicato, 97 F.3d at
628. By contrast, Kirchoff, Smith, Wegrzyn, and Jennings were charged with posses-
sion by a domestic violence misdemeanant, and argued for application of the restora-
tion exception for domestic violence misdemeanants. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii)
(2000). Congress patterned the domestic violence misdemeanant restoration exception
after the restoration exception for felons. United States v. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d 748, 751
(8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2936 (2005). Thus, the two restoration excep-
tions contain substantially similar language. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20) (2000),
with id. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii). However, the restoration exception for domestic violence
misdemeanants contains a parenthetical phrase that the felon restoration exception
does not: "A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of [a domestic
2006]
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ception, Congress deliberately allowed the states to decide who may possess
firearms.74 States were not given full discretionary authority, but they could
make their decisions through the mechanical means listed in the statute: ex-
pungement, setting aside of a conviction, pardon, or restoration of civil
rights.75 A state's use of these statutorily defined mechanical means of restor-
ing civil rights represents the state's judgment that a class of people - for
example, those who had been pardoned or to whom civil rights had been re-
stored - may be trusted to possess firearms, despite their prior convictions.
76
The court concluded, however, that "it is hard to see why Congress would
wish to distinguish between one whose civil rights were never taken away
(Indelicato) and one whose civil rights were mechanically taken away and
mechanically restored., 77 Thus, despite the fact that Indelicato never lost his
civil rights under Massachusetts law, the First Circuit concluded that Indeli-
cato's rights should be treated as "restored" for purposes of the exception to
the possession ban.
78
In United States v. Wegrzyn,79 the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with the
First Circuit. The defendant in Wegrzyn had been convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor in Michigan and subsequently arrested for possession
of a firearm in violation of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban. Michigan, like
Missouri, strips misdemeanants of the right to vote while confined in a cor-
rectional facility.8 1 Wegrzyn, however, was never confined in a correctional
facility and therefore never lost his civil rights.82 Nonetheless, the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Wegrzyn was eligible for the
restoration exception and could possess firearms when his probation ended.
8 3
In support of its finding, the Sixth Circuit offered reasoning similar to that of
the First Circuit in Indelicato.
8 4
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Smith had argued it was not "at liberty
to engage in the fiction created by Indelicato" because the domestic violence
violence misdemeanor] if ... [it] is an offense for which the person ... has had civil
rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil
rights under such an offense) .... " 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000) (emphasis
added); id. § 921(a)(20). This distinction has proved crucial. See infra notes 85-93
and accompanying text.
74. Indelicato, 97 F.3d at 629-30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 630.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 631.
79. 305 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 594.
81. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 168.758b (2005); Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026 (2000).
82. United States v. Wegrzyn, 106 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961, 964 (W.D. Mich.
2000), aff'd, 305 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss1/13
RESTORING RIGHTS
misdemeanant restoration exception of section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) "includes
language that precludes such a fiction."85 The statute applies to "civil rights
[that have been] restored (if the law of the applicablejurisdiction provides for
the loss of civil rights under such an offense) .... The Smith court noted
that "[t]his parenthetical language is not contained within [the felony restora-
,87tion exception that] was applied in Indelicato." Furthermore, the court noted
that applying the Indelicato "fiction" to the domestic violence misdemeanant
restoration exception would render the Domestic Violence Gun Ban ineffec-
tive, since most misdemeanants do not lose their civil rights.88 The Eighth
Circuit thus found this distinction between the two restoration exceptions an
appropriate basis on which to reject Indelicato and deny Smith the restoration
exception.
8 9
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court in Wegrzyn distin-
guished Smith on the grounds that the Iowa law at issue in Smith did not strip
misdemeanants of civil rights.9° By contrast, Michigan law did, triggering
application of the parenthetical language of the restoration exception.9' Because
Michigan law thus "provide[d] for the loss of civil rights under [a domestic
violence misdemeanor], 92 the Wegrzyn district court found it appropriate to
apply the restoration exception to Wegrzyn using the Indelicato fiction.9
3
Most recently, in United States v. Jennings,94 the Fourth Circuit aligned
itself with the Eighth Circuit. Jennings was convicted of criminal domestic
violence in South Carolina and received a 30-day suspended sentence but was
never incarcerated. 95 He was later charged with possession of a firearm in
violation of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban.96 Jennings first advanced a
plain language argument that his rights were restored.97 Jennings admitted the
argument was weak, and the court was quick to reject it, noting that "the word
'restore' means 'to give back ... something lost or taken away"' and to re-
85. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1999).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added).
87. Smith, 171 F.3d at 623.
88. Id. For example, in Missouri, most domestic violence misdemeanants, be-
cause they do not serve a sentence of confinement, would be allowed to possess fire-
arms under the Indelicato fiction. United States v. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d 748, 751 (8th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2936 (2005).
89. Smith, 171 F.3d at 623.
90. United States v. Wegrzyn, 106 F. Supp. 2d 959, 966 (W.D. Mich. 2000),
aff'd, 305 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).
91. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(BXii) (2000).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
93. Wegrzyn, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 966; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)33)(B)(ii) (2000).
94. 323 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2003).
95. Id. at 265.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 266-67.
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store a thing never lost is a "definitional impossibility." 98 Jennings next ar-
gued that a literal application of the word "restored" would produce an absurd
result: treating misdemeanants like Jennings who had never lost their civil
rights more harshly than those who had lost them and had them restored.99
Jennings argued that Indelicato and Wegrzyn supported his position. 0 0 The
Fourth Circuit, however, found the decisions of four other circuits, including
the Eighth, to be more persuasive.' 0' Thus, the court held that, because
Jennings had never lost his civil rights nor had them restored, he was not eli-
gible for the restoration exception. 1
02
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Actual Incarceration as a Prerequisite to Restoration of Rights in
Missouri
Kirchoff first argued that he was entitled to the restoration exception
that would have made his firearm possession legal even though he was never
"confined under a sentence of imprisonment."' 3 Under Missouri law, he
argued, actual incarceration is not required to trigger the restoration excep-
tion.1°4 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding
that the plain language of the Missouri statute providing for the loss of civil
98. Id. (quoting McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 269. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding a conviction did not violate equal protection when misdemeanants in the
District of Columbia did not lose their civil rights, even though the result was to put
them in a worse position than a person in another jurisdiction who loses their civil
rights and later has them restored); United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 565-67
(9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting equal protection challenge even though Arizona law strips
felons but not domestic violence misdemeanants of their civil rights because the dis-
tinction is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose); United States v.
Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623-26 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that in order to have civil rights
restored a person must first lose them and that the distinction made between misde-
meanants who never lose their civil rights and those who lose them and later have
them restored does not violate equal protection); McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d
1005, 1007-10 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying application of the restoration exception to a
convicted felon who was never incarcerated and, therefore, never deprived of his civil
rights under Vermont law, even though that conclusion meant people in certain states
would be more susceptible to federal prosecution).
102. Jennings, 323 F.3d at 275.
103. United States v. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d 748, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2936 (2005) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000)). Kirchoff served
time before his case went before the Eighth Circuit but after he was charged with the
federal crime of firearm possession by a prohibited person. Id. at 749.
104. Id. at 750.
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rights'0 5 upon conviction of certain offenses requires actual imprisonment.
10 6
At the time Kirchoff committed the federal offense, he was not "confined
under a sentence of imprisonment," and, consequently, he had not lost his
civil rights.'0 7 Accordingly, the court found he was not eligible to have his
rights restored and, as a result, did not qualify for the restoration exception.1
0 8
Kirchoff argued the Eighth Circuit precedent on point (Smith'0 9 and
Keeney'"0 ) should not control his case, because the state statutes in those
cases did not provide for loss of civil rights for a misdemeanor conviction,
whereas in Missouri, misdemeanants such as Kirchoff may lose their civil
rights."' Instead, he argued that the court should follow the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit in Wegrzyn, which involved a Michigan loss-of-civil-rights stat-
ute similar to Missouri's.1 2 The Sixth Circuit held that, even if a misdemean-
ant were not sentenced to confinement, he or she could still claim the restora-
tion exception." 3 However, in Kirchoff, the Eighth Circuit refused to adopt
the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, relying instead on the reasoning it had adopted
in Smith' 1 4 and the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Jennings. 11
105. In footnote 2, the court noted that, because neither party raised the issue, it
was assuming for the purposes of its opinion that Missouri's taking away of the right
to vote is a loss of civil rights for purposes of the restoration exception. Id. at 750 n.2.
The court noted that "[a]lthough the Congress did not specify which civil rights it had
in mind [in § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii)], the plurality view among the circuits ... is that Con-
gress had in mind the core cluster of citizen rights - namely, the right to vote, to serve
on a jury and to hold public office." Id. (quoting United States v. Keeney, 241 F.3d
1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2001)).
106. Id. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted
[o]f any crime shall be disqualified from registering and voting in any election under
the laws of this state while confined under a sentence of imprisonment . Mo.
REV. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
107. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
110. United States v. Keeney, 241 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2001). In Keeney, the
Eighth Circuit held that revocation of a domestic violence misdemeanant's right to
possess a firearm while on probation was not a loss of civil rights under section
921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Id. at 1044. The court held the right to possess a firearm does not
fall within the "core cluster of 'citizen' rights.. . namely, the right to vote, to serve on
a jury and to hold public office." Id. (quoting United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627,
630 (1st Cir. 1996)).
111. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 561.026 (2000).
112. See United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). Compare Mo.
REV. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000) (stripping people of the right to vote "while confined
under a sentence of imprisonment") with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.758b (2005)
(stripping people of their right to vote during their "confinement in jail or prison.").
113. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 750.
114. Id. at 751; United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
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B. Kirchoff's Alternative Argument: He Lost His Civil Rights
Kirchoff argued alternatively that if actual incarceration is necessary for
loss of civil rights under Missouri law, he lost his civil rights when he was
jailed from March 14 to April 13, 2001, and was accordingly entitled to the
restoration exception.116 The court disagreed, holding that Kirchoff's con-
finement was merely pretrial detention, which did not satisfy the statutory
requirement of confinement "under a sentence of imprisonment."' 17 Because
he was not confined under a sentence of imprisonment, he did not lose his
civil rights and was, therefore, not entitled to the restoration exception. Is
Similarly, Kirchoff argued that he was entitled to the restoration excep-
tion because he lost his civil rights when he was jailed on August 14, 2002,
shortly after his indictment in federal court for firearm possession. 19 Kirchoff
contended that, because Missouri law provides credit for time served pre-
trial, 12 his pretrial detention in 2001 should merge with his 2002 incarcera-
tion into a single sentence of imprisonment. 2 1 He further argued that because
he lost his civil rights during the later period of confinement, the two sen-
tences merged, and, therefore, Kirchoff also lost his civil rights during the
earlier period of confinement.' 
22
The court agreed that Kirchoff lost his civil rights during his confine-
ment beginning August 14, 2002, but rejected Kirchoff's argument that the
2002 incarceration qualified him for the restoration exception. 23 The Mis-
souri statute allowing a person to receive credit on a sentence for pretrial de-
tention does not provide for a loss of civil rights during the pretrial detention,
even if the defendant loses civil rights during the later incarceration. 24 Fur-
thermore, the court found that the credit statute did not merge Kirchoffs sen-
tenced jail time with his earlier detention pending trial into a single sentence
of imprisonment. 25 Finally, the court noted that Kirchoff's civil rights were
restored, but not until May 19, 2003, when he was released.' 26 On that date,
Kirchoff could legally possess a gun.'27
116. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 752.
117. Id; Mo. REV. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
118. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 752.
119. Id. at 749, 752.
120. The relevant statute provides, in part: "Such person shall receive credit to-
ward the service of a sentence of imprisonment for all time in prison, jail or custody
after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the
time in custody was related to that offense .... Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.031.1 (2000).
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Finally, Kirchoff argued that his 2002 federal indictment for illegal pos-
session should be invalidated because of his later restoration of rights, in
2003.128 The court rejected this argument as well, reasoning that such a result
would be incompatible with Congress's intention in enacting the restoration
exception for domestic violence misdemeanants, 129 which was to keep fire-
arms out of the hands of domestic abusers so as to prevent them from using a
gun against their victims.' 30 Accordingly, the court refused to set aside
Kirchoff's conviction based on his later restoration of rights.'3 ' Having re-
jected all of Kirchoff's arguments, the court affirmed the district court's de-
nial of Kirchoff's motion to dismiss his federal indictment.1
32
V. COMMENT
By refusing to retreat from its reasoning in Smith, the Eighth Circuit in
Kirchoff solidified its position on one side of the circuit split on the issue of
how the restoration exception to the Domestic Violence Gun Ban should ap-
ply. The court could have wavered by distinguishing Kirchoff's situation
from Smith's based on the differing state laws at issue, as did the district
court in Wegrzyn. 133 Smith could not have lost his civil rights in any event,
because Iowa law does not strip misdemeanants of their civil rights.
134
Kirchoff, on the other hand, could have lost his civil rights under Missouri
law as a domestic violence misdemeanant, but did not because he was never
"confined under a sentence of imprisonment."' 135 Applying the district court's
logic in Wegrzyn, the parenthetical language of the restoration exception, "(if
the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense),"136 would be invoked in Kirchoff's case. Thus, Kirchoff
would be treated as if his civil rights had been restored, making him eligible
for the restoration exception.
Had the Eighth Circuit so retreated from its Smith position, however, the
result would be that all domestic violence misdemeanants in Missouri could
128. Id.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
130. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d at 752.
131. Id. Kirchoff's final argument was that the district court failed to apply the
rule of lenity. Id. at 752-53. The court rejected this argument as well, because the rule
only applies when a statute is grievously ambiguous or uncertain. Id. at 753 (citing
United States v. Andrews, 339 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2003)). The court held that
section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) was not grievously ambiguous or uncertain and, therefore,
the rule of lenity did not apply. Id.
132. Id. at 750, 753.
133. United States v. Wegrzyn, 106 F. Supp. 2d 959, 966 (W.D. Mich. 2000),
affd, 305 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1999).
135. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
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lawfully possess firearms under the restoration exception. The controlling fact
would be whether the relevant state statute deprives misdemeanants of their
civil rights, rather than whether the defendant had actually b3en deprived of
civil rights and then had them restored. 37 This analysis would prevent the
more favorable treatment of domestic violence misdemeanants who have
served jail time in Missouri and are presumably more dangerous because their
behavior warranted a sentence of confinement. Instead, all domestic violence
misdemeanants in Missouri would be treated equally - they would all be al-
lowed to possess firearms under federal law. Allowing all domestic violence
misdemeanants in Missouri to have guns, however, is inconsistent with Con-
gress's goal of keeping guns away from domestic abusers.' 38 Thus, in terms
of results, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Kirchoff is more persuasive than
that of the Sixth Circuit in Wegrzyn.
In addition, the Eighth Circuit has the better plain-language argument.
Because, by definition, something must be taken away in order for it to be
restored later, a defendant must be deprived of his civil rights under state law
in order for those rights to be restored. If a defendant is not deprived of his
civil rights, then they may not be restored, and the defendant is not eligible
for the restoration exception.
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit is correct in holding that the distinction
between domestic violence misdemeanants who are not eligible for the resto-
ration exception because they never lost their civil rights and domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants who are eligible because they went to jail and had their
civil rights restored does not violate equal protection. The distinction is ra-
tionally related to the legitimate government purpose of keeping guns away
from convicted domestic abusers. Under the same rational basis analysis, the
Constitution's equal protection mandate is not violated when defendants are
treated differently based on whether the jurisdiction of the predicate offense
allows for loss and restoration of civil rights. 139 Therefore, given Eighth Cir-
137. "'[M]ost misdemeanor convictions do not result in the loss of civil rights[,]'
and thus would not fit within the restoration exception." Kirchoff 387 F.3d at 751
(quoting United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in
original).
138. See 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (daily ed. March 21, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
139. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding a
conviction did not violate equal protection when misdemeanants in the District of
Columbia did not lose their civil rights, even though the result put them in a worse
position than a person in another jurisdiction who loses their civil rights and later has
them restored); United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 565-67 (9th Cir. 2000) (re-
jecting equal protection challenge, even though Arizona law strips felons of their civil
rights, but not domestic violence misdemeanants, because the distinction is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose); McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005,
1007-10 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying restoration exception to convicted felon who was
never incarcerated, and, therefore never deprived of his civil rights under Vermont
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cuit precedent in Smith, the plain language of the restoration exception to the
Domestic Violence Gun Ban, and the absence of a valid equal protection ar-
gument, the decision in Kirchoff was sound.
Although the analysis is sound, the result remains strange. The domestic
offenders who are presumably the most dangerous because their behavior was
bad enough to earn them time in a Missouri jail are allowed to have guns.
Offenders who received a suspended sentence, however, are not allowed to
have guns. This result is bothersome, but it is not a problem for the judiciary
to solve. The disparity results from Congress's decision to allow states to
determine who may be fit to own a firearm after past bad behavior, such as by
choosing which criminals lose their civil rights and how those civil rights
may be restored. Therefore, the solution lies either in Congress or in the state
legislatures.
There is no indication that Congress intends to repeal the Domestic Vio-
lence Gun Ban. The real problem is not the Gun Ban anyway; rather, the
problem is the interaction between the federal restoration exception and state
law. Because there is likewise no indication that Congress intends to repeal
the restoration exception, the state legislatures must make any desired
changes.
To fix the disparate impact problem caused by the operation of the resto-
ration exception in Missouri, the Missouri legislature could modify state law
on loss and restoration of civil rights. The pro-gun camp might support a
modification of the statute that would strip civil rights by deleting the lan-
guage requiring confinement under a sentence of imprisonment and adding
language allowing restoration of rights upon the expiration of any sentence,
including probationary periods. 140 Under such a modified statute, Kirchoff
would have been eligible for the federal restoration exception upon comple-
tion of his probation. This modification would change Missouri's determina-
tion of who is fit to own a gun by allowing more prior domestic abusers to
own guns upon completion of a sentence that does not necessarily involve
incarceration.
The anti-gun faction might support changing Missouri's risk calculus to
make it harder for a former domestic abuser to own a gun. For example, the
legislature could enact a statute providing for restoration of civil rights for the
purposes of the Domestic Violence Gun Ban only upon an individualized
determination that the person may be trusted with a firearm, rather than
automatic restoration of civil rights upon completion of a jail sentence. In
order to accommodate defendants like Kirchoff who did not serve time for
their domestic violence convictions, the law could be further modified by
stripping defendants of their civil rights upon conviction rather than incar-
ceration. Under this scheme, all persons convicted of domestic violence mis-
law, even though that conclusion meant people in certain states would be more sus-
ceptible to federal prosecution).
140. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000).
20061
17
Nichols: Nichols: Eighth Circuit Revisits Restoration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
demeanors would have the chance to have their civil rights restored and the
corresponding opportunity to possess firearms again, rather than being
banned for life from gun possession, but the restoration would not be auto-
matic. Finally, anti-gun legislators could amend the statute more drastically to
provide that only felons lose the right to vote during sentenced confinement,
thus completely banning all misdemeanants, including domestic abusers,
from the restoration exception.
Such changes in Missouri law would require a careful examination of
the policies behind the Domestic Violence Gun Ban, the restoration excep-
tion, and state law governing loss and restoration of civil rights. Until such
changes are made, Missouri lawyers must be aware of the consequences of a
client's domestic violence conviction. A client like Kirchoff who is not incar-
cerated based on his domestic violence conviction should be advised that,
under Kirchoff and barring one of the other exceptions to the Domestic Vio-
lence Gun Ban,14 1 he may never again possess a firearm. On the other hand, a
client who is incarcerated will thereby lose civil rights, but their restoration
upon release will allow that client to possess firearms without violating
federal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to its design, the restoration exception to the Domestic Vio-
lence Gun Ban varies in application because Congress intentionally allowed
the states to apply their own judgments about which persons may be trusted
with guns despite a prior domestic violence conviction. Under Missouri law,
only those domestic violence misdemeanants who have been incarcerated and
subsequently restored with their civil rights may be trusted with firearm pos-
session. 142 Until the Missouri legislature adopts changes, a domestic violence
misdemeanant who manages to avoid jail will never be allowed to possess a
firearm under federal law.' 43 Attorneys must be aware of the peculiarities of
the law in Missouri as it stands after Kirchoff, and be prepared to advise their
clients accordingly.
NATALIE J. NICHOLS
141. The other exceptions apply "if the conviction has been expunged or set aside,
or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned . . . unless the pardon, ex-
pungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not
ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000).
142. See United States v. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d 748, 750-52 (8th Cir. 2004), cerl.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2936 (2005).
143. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.026(1) (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9),
921 (a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000). Other exceptions to the Domestic Violence Gun Ban may
apply. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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